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Conference Reports: Public Utilities Research Center Annual Conference: 
Regulation as art and science 
Maine Policy Review (1992). Volume 1, Number 2 
 
by Christopher Spruce 
The efforts of the past 15 to 20 years to roll back the regulation of private enterprise by the 
government has produced unforeseen results. The most significant of these is that the amount of 
regulatory activity actually has increased, concluded Glen Robinson, former commissioner of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Robinson's remarks were made at the annual 
conference of the Public Utilities Research Center at the University of Florida in Gainesville, 
Florida on April 23-24, 1992.  
Robinson, now a professor of law at the University of Virginia, cited the telecommunications 
industry as an example of "remarkable transformation" that resulted from public policies that 
consciously encouraged competition in lieu of monopoly regulation. But what really has 
happened, he argued, at least in telecommunications, is that deregulation has increased both the 
number of players and the number of plays to be watched by the FCC and other regulatory 
agencies. "Thus, we get more, not less, regulation," Robinson said. "That regulation seems more 
active today than it was in the monopoly era...is ironic, but not inexplicable."  
Neither art nor science  
To support his contention that "the history of regulation is a history of a growth industry," 
Robinson cited a study he conducted. The study sampled three years of FCC reports devoted to 
final telephone and telegraph decisions. In 1968, such reports totaled 180 pages or four percent 
of FCC report pages for that year; in 1977, the reports totaled 1,000 pages or 20 percent of all 
FCC report pages for that year; and, 1991, 1,800 pages or 25 percent of all reported FCC actions. 
In other words, over 23 years, the volume of FCC regulatory reports on telecommunications has 
increased by one order of magnitude, said Robinson. Very few of those pages were related to 
deregulation, he noted.  
One of the key questions facing regulation today, Robinson suggested, concerns the system's 
tolerance of experimentation. How much risk of failure will it allow, he asked.  
"Regulatory policy is neither a science nor an art," Robinson observed. Science, he said, 
"operates at too fine a level to answer" many important policy questions, while " 'art' implies 
fuzzy judgments." On the one hand, too much information; on the other hand, too little precise 
information. Somewhere in between is the appropriate balance.  
Regulators," Robinson concludes, "need to act more like artisans than political artists," if the 
regulatory system is to operate as it should.  
 
Preserve the marbled structure  
Another conference speaker, Sharon Megdal, a former commissioner of the Arizona Public 
Service Commission, agreed with Robinson that regulation is neither an art nor a science. 
Ultimately," she pointed out, "this is a very political exercise as well as an economic exercise."  
Megdal recalled the social contract theory of regulation, which established regulatory bodies to 
price the services of natural monopolies and which required that the government not grant 
monopolies without protecting the public from price gouging. But as fellow conference speaker 
Harry Trebing and others have pointed out, the old social contract has broken down. Questions 
now arise as to the purpose of regulation and at what governmental level it ought to occur. 
Megdal asked, is localism in regulation still important? Should the "marbled structure" of 
regulation - local, state and federal - continue or are state and local regulations anachronisms?  
Megdal argues for a preservation of the marbled system. She argues that the centralized approach 
to regulation (i.e., federal only) "would not provide the laboratories of the states." The results of 
experiments within regional holding companies, Megdal claimed, have provided important data 
on models that may have national applications. "A uniform federal policy," she argued, "would 
not provide various data on different models." The downside of state experimentation is the lack 
of control within state laboratories, which means "the results are not always quantifiable in the 
short-term."  
Deregulation is not enough  
Harry Trebing, former director of the Michigan State University Institute for Public Utilities, as 
the first speaker at the conference, argued that public utility regulation was at a crossroads where 
two schools of thought are attempting to define the future direction of public policy. The first 
school argues that competition is increasing and thus further deregulation is the appropriate 
policy path. The second maintains that "evolving industry structures are not competitive" and 
that competition and monopoly will continue to operate at the same time. Public policy, then, 
"must redefine the role of regulation to come to grips with the new market structures," according 
to this theory.  
Under the first approach, said Trebing, new forms of competition have made regulation obsolete. 
These new forms of competition include supply-side options (e.g., qualifying facilities, 
independent power producers) and demand-side options (e.g., conservation) in electric power 
generation, and changes in both the interexchange and local exchange markets in 
telecommunications. As a result, the argument for further deregulation goes, the original social 
contract has been "badly eroded."  
The second theory is put forward by those who believe that competition is not pervasive, but 
selective and cannot be sustained when applied broadly. They also believe, particularly in 
telecommunications, that technology and consumer demands are driving change. But the way to 
respond to these changes is through regulatory reform that includes policies which constrain 
markets as well as policies which allow market pressures to work. Policies that rely solely on 
deregulation will result in major distortions, this view argues, because of the structural changes 
that have occurred in public utility industries in recent years.  
Trebing's own view is closer to the second approach. Regulatory reform should "take a holistic 
view of (1) regulatory planning responsibilities, (2) parameters for management decision-
making, [and] (3) exploiting market forces in a realistic fashion as an adjunct to regulatory 
oversight" Among favored options for effecting the latter, Trebing advocates "targeted 
incentives" that will be linked to quality of service and performance criteria. He cited incentives 
for cost-effective fuel procurement for electric utilities and incentives for reliable service in 
telecommunications.  
The Public Utilities Research Center at the University of Florida is one of the oldest centers in 
the U.S. devoted to teaching, service, and research in energy, communications and public 
utilities. The PURC program has been the inspiration for other such university-based centers, 
including the University of Maine's Project for the Study of Public Regulation and the 
Environment (PURE). 
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